Washington’s recent turn from high‑profile lunar ambitions toward an explicitly terrestrial war‑preparation posture — exemplified by the Golden Dome missile‑defense proposal and the rapid fielding of proliferated LEO architectures — has turned space into the decisive enabler and target of future European high‑intensity conflict. This article analyses the U.S. trajectory, the commercial‑military entanglement (SpaceX, Blue Origin), Moscow’s counter‑space precedent, and the concrete steps Germany and NATO must take to deter, survive and operate in a space‑contested war with Russia.
The U.S. strategic pivot: weapons, interceptors and proliferated constellations
Since 2024–25 the United States has signalled a clear prioritisation of space assets directly tied to terrestrial warfighting: a layered missile‑defence architecture that explicitly includes space‑based sensors and interceptors, and rapid investment in distributed low‑Earth‑orbit (LEO) constellations to make national and tactical capabilities resilient. President Trump’s Golden Dome announcement framed the effort as “capable of intercepting missiles even if they are launched from other sides of the world and even if they are launched from space.” — (CNBC, May 20, 2025). (cnbc.com)
Commercial partners have become operational force multipliers
The defence-industrial model for space is changing: large, reusable launch providers and NewSpace OEMs are now integral suppliers of warfighting infrastructure. Reuters reporting that SpaceX’s Starshield unit is building a classified, government‑owned network of hundreds of LEO imaging and relay satellites under NRO authority shows how commercial scale is being harnessed for persistent ISR and low‑latency targeting. (investing.com)
Language from the service chiefs: normalising space fires
Senior U.S. leaders have explicitly articulated a transition from “space as support” to space as a warfighting domain: “It’s time that we can clearly say that we need space fires and we need weapon systems.” — Gen. Stephen N. Whiting, U.S. Space Force, April 10, 2025. — Micah Hanks, The Debrief (quote). Micah Hanks, U.S. Officials Warn of Arms Race in Orbit…, April 10, 2025. (thedebrief.org)
Moscow’s precedent: kinetic tests, close‑proximity craft, and the debris problem
Russia’s 2021 direct‑ascent ASAT strike on the defunct Kosmos‑1408 satellite produced thousands of trackable fragments and set a precedent for kinetic counterspace operations that create transboundary risks for all operators. The test forced the International Space Station to undertake avoidance actions and sparked broad industry and diplomatic condemnation; it remains a practical demonstration that adversaries will accept long‑term orbital collateral for short‑term advantage. (space.com)
Implications for Germany and NATO: doctrine, centres and gaps
NATO and Germany have already been working to integrate space into alliance operations. NATO’s Space Centre of Excellence and the Alliance’s adoption of space doctrines show institutional momentum toward operationalising space as a military domain. At the same time German parliamentary and expert debate — including a public hearing in 2024 — has concluded that “we must be able to defend and deter in space,” and urged a whole‑of‑government Weltraum (space) security architecture. Those statements make clear that Berlin recognises space as essential to both national resilience and NATO collective defence. (act.nato.int)
Principles for an operational German‑NATO space strategy against Russian counterspace action
Any credible strategy for a high‑intensity NATO–Russia contingency must accept three interlinked lessons from recent practice: first, large fixed satellites are vulnerable; second, commercial launch and small‑sat manufacturing collapse traditional cost and timeline barriers; third, non‑kinetic means (EW, cyber, jamming, spoofing) often precede or substitute for kinetic attacks. From these lessons flow five operational priorities that are concrete, time‑sensitive and defensible.
Priority 1 — Resilience by disaggregation and multi‑layer redundancy
Germany and NATO should accelerate fielding distributed, proliferated architectures for the functions that matter most in early conflict: tactical communications, PNT (position, navigation, timing), missile warning and low‑latency ISR. The U.S. Space Development Agency’s Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) demonstrates the concept of “many small, replaceable nodes” feeding a transport and tracking layer; Germany should commit industrial and spectrum resources to allied tranches and ensure interoperability with NATO transport/track layers. (highergov.com)
Priority 2 — Harden command, control and critical ground nodes
Satellites are only as useful as the networks that task them. Germany must harden and decentralise ground‑station networks, invest in alternative ground‑segment pathways and prepare secure hosted payload options (hosted on allied commercial buses) so that a successful first‑strike against a handful of German assets cannot blind German forces. The Bundestag expert record already recommends bundling national SDA/SDA‑like capabilities and reducing internal stovepipes between the Bundeswehr’s Weltraumkommando and the Cyber‑Information‑Room (CIR). (bundestag.de)
Priority 3 — Protect PNT and deliver APNT options for the force
GNSS denial or spoofing will be an opening move in any Russian plan to create local chaos. Germany should prioritise resilient APNT (alternative PNT) for deployed NATO brigades — combining inertial systems, terrestrial beacons, multi‑constellation receivers and rapid airborne/spaceborne relay options — and require APNT resilience as a condition of procurement. This is a low‑visibility, high‑impact resilience measure that mitigates early operational paralysis; it is also an exportable capability for NATO partners in theatre. (highergov.com)
Priority 4 — Integrate offensive‑defensive doctrine and legal control
Deterrence in the space domain rests on credible denial and the political will to impose costs. NATO must finish doctrine that links detection to proportionate, reversible countermeasures in cyber, EW and, only where necessary, non‑debris‑generating kinetic options. Rules of engagement and pre‑delegated authorities will be required so that time‑critical space fires can be matched by timely responses. The Alliance’s new doctrinal work — for which the NATO Space Centre of Excellence is already a hub — must therefore be operationalised through exercises that include realistic counterspace play. (act.nato.int)
Priority 5 — Industrial base, allied burden‑sharing and the commercial interface
Germany should scale industrial investments (DLR, OHB, HENSOLDT, and niche NewSpace firms) to provide sovereign capabilities in essential niches (optical downlinks, small high‑performance EO, agile on‑orbit servicing and de‑orbiting services). At the same time Berlin must accept the reality of commercial–military entanglement: U.S. practice shows prime contractors and launch firms (SpaceX, Blue Origin) will be operational partners. Germany’s strategic task is to secure access and legal assurances for wartime use while preserving civilian‑commercial operations to the extent possible. (arstechnica.com)
Tactical sequencing for a German contribution in a NATO–Russia contingency
In the first 72 hours Germany should prioritise (1) activating redundant PNT/APNT nodes for deployed troops; (2) establishing secure, low‑latency transport links into NATO’s PWSA/transport layer; (3) moving sensitive command and ISR‑fusion workloads to hardened, distributed cloud nodes; and (4) executing pre‑planned electromagnetic protection measures for key ground infrastructure. Over weeks, Germany must support launch‑and‑replace cycles (rideshares, hosted payloads) and contribute to allied on‑orbit replenishment and de‑orbiting services to limit long‑term debris exposure and restore capacity. These steps follow the operational logic already visible in allied development programs. (highergov.com)
Diplomacy, norms and long‑term risk management
Operational planning must be paired with political action: push for emergency UN mechanisms to de‑escalate debris‑generating strikes, lead European standardisation on space situational awareness (SSA) data‑sharing, and press for export‑control clarity on dual‑use space services so that commercial firms can be operational partners without becoming unilateral gatekeepers. The Kosmos‑1408 episode showed how destructive counterspace actions externalise risk for all actors; political containment of that risk is as important as technical resilience. (space.com)
Conclusion — a sober, layered realism
Space is no longer a distant, optional theatre for prestige missions. The U.S. decision to prioritise Earth‑centric warfighting capabilities from orbit, the operational integration of commercial constellations, and Russia’s demonstrated willingness to accept orbital collateral change the preventive calculus for European defence. Germany must choose a strategy that emphasises resilient, distributed architectures, rapid allied interoperability, hardening of ground and PNT systems, and a diplomatic track to limit debris and escalation. Those choices determine whether Europe will be an operational actor in the next space‑contested crisis or a vulnerable consumer of allied coverage.
