A coordinated US–Israeli military campaign struck multiple targets across Iran on 28 February–1 March 2026, including leadership compounds in Tehran; Iranian state and international reporting say Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed and Iran carried out wide-ranging retaliatory missile and drone attacks against Israel and US bases in the Gulf. President Donald Trump framed the operation as a “major combat” campaign to destroy Iran’s missile and naval capabilities and to pressure regime change, while Israel described the strikes as intended to remove an “existential threat.” (washingtonpost.com)
What is known now
Journalistic and official accounts show the operation combined long‑range US air and naval power with Israeli strikes inside Iran. US forces in the region — including carrier strike groups and high‑end strike aircraft — were employed and US officials said the campaign targeted missile sites, naval assets and command-and-control nodes; Israeli statements emphasised attacks on regime infrastructure and leadership. Iran responded with ballistic missiles and UAVs against Israeli territory and US installations in the Gulf, and several Gulf states reported strikes near bases and infrastructure. International actors, including Russia and China, publicly condemned the US–Israeli action and called for immediate de‑escalation. (washingtonpost.com)
Next hours: US posture and immediate options
In the immediate hours after the strikes Washington’s publicly signalled priorities are protecting US personnel and facilities, sustaining precision strikes on identified military targets, and maintaining freedom of movement for naval and air assets in the Gulf. US embassy advisories and shelter‑in‑place orders were issued across the region while commanders moved missile‑defence assets and additional ships into defensive positions; the White House framed the operation as a multiday pressure campaign. Operationally, immediate US actions will focus on suppressing Iran’s missile and naval launch capacity, defending allied bases and sea lanes, and using intelligence to enable further precision targeting — not on deploying a large invasion force in the short term. (washingtonpost.com)
Days and weeks: plausible trajectories and Washington’s stated objectives
US political messaging has explicitly named destruction of Iran’s missile industry and substantial degradation of its military and proxy capabilities as central objectives; President Trump urged Iranians to seize the moment to change their government. Quoting the president: “We are going to destroy their missiles and raze their missile industry to the ground.” — Abbie Cheeseman et al., “Iran’s supreme leader killed in U.S.-Israeli attack; Tehran strikes Israel, Arab states”, The Washington Post, Feb. 28, 2026, The Washington Post. (washingtonpost.com)
That declared aim creates at least three near‑term policy tracks that can be expected to run in parallel over weeks: sustained kinetic pressure to degrade launch, storage and command facilities; diplomatic pressure and sanctions to isolate any surviving regime elements; and covert influence operations — including intelligence support to internal dissent — intended to foster political fracture. US officials have also signalled they do not plan an open, years‑long occupation, arguing the campaign will be limited in duration, but they have simultaneously left the door open to further operations if Iran continues to strike US assets or allies. The tension between a declared short campaign and the scale of objectives (degrading state military capacity and producing political change) is the central strategic contradiction Washington will confront. (washingtonpost.com)
Endstate debate: puppet government, negotiated settlement, or deeper intervention?
Washington’s public statements leave the “endstate” ambiguous: officials insist on eliminating military threats and say they want a political outcome in Tehran more favourable to US interests, but there is no credible reporting that a US plan to occupy Iran or to install a stable, US‑backed puppet government (in the manner often portrayed in popular analogy) has been prepared. Historically, US covert and overt interventions have sometimes sought client regimes or parallel authorities — for example, the 1953 coup that removed Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh involved CIA planning to install a pro‑Western government. That episode remains a touchstone in Iranian memory and is documented in declassified US material. (cia.gov)
In practice, three constraints reduce the plausibility of a straightforward “puppet‑state” outcome in the near term: Iran’s internal political and military resilience (multiple power centres and an organised IRGC); the depth of Iranian nationalist resistance to foreign occupation; and the geopolitical cost of sustained Western control, given Russia’s and China’s likely diplomatic and material responses. More probable near‑to‑medium‑term outcomes are a degraded Iranian military posture with a fragmented political elite, prolonged internal instability, and an internationalised reconstruction and political competition scenario — outcomes that could produce local proxies or interim authorities favourable to Western aims but not a clean, externally imposed client regime. Washington may attempt to exploit opposition movements politically (as it did through recognition strategies in other crises), but converting that into durable governance control would be difficult even with extensive US support. (en.wikipedia.org)
Israel’s role and the regional security architecture
Israel was a central operational partner: Israeli officials said months of planning preceded the strikes and that Israel’s air and intelligence operations targeted regime command structures inside Iran while US forces struck military and missile infrastructure. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu framed the operation as aimed at removing an “existential threat” and said it would “create the conditions for the brave Iranian people to take their destiny into their own hands.” “Our joint action will create the conditions for the brave Iranian people to take their destiny into their own hands.” — Lior Soroka et al., reporting of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, The Washington Post, Feb. 28, 2026, The Washington Post. (washingtonpost.com)
Israel’s operational role increases the risk of the conflict broadening: Iranian proxy networks across Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen give Tehran asymmetric means to impose costs on Israel and regional partners; Gulf states hosting US bases have been directly threatened; and sea‑line interdiction in the Strait of Hormuz could disrupt global energy markets. For NATO and European states the immediate challenge is political: to contain spillover, secure critical infrastructure and manage a refugee and humanitarian flow, while balancing alliance solidarity with concerns about legality and escalation. NATO has said it is closely monitoring developments and many European capitals have urged de‑escalation even where they have acknowledged Iran’s destabilising regional behaviour. (newsweek.com)
Strategic interpretation: choices, risks and likely equilibrium
Two structural facts will shape the campaign’s trajectory. First, the United States and Israel can substantially degrade specific Iranian capabilities at distance — missile launchers, storage bunkers, command nodes and naval assets are vulnerable to precision strikes — but kinetic effects do not automatically translate into durable political control. Second, decapitation of senior leadership increases short‑term shock but tends to sharpen internal cohesion among hardline elements and empowers proxies that can sustain a low‑intensity regional war of attrition. The likely equilibrium in the coming weeks is intense kinetic pressure paired with high diplomatic friction: Western attempts to force a rapid political reset in Tehran while Russia, China and regional actors mobilise to limit Western influence and to protect their interests. Civilians and regional economies will bear immediate costs, and the security architecture across the Middle East will be reshaped toward greater militarisation and fragmentation unless a credible diplomatic break emerges quickly. (washingtonpost.com)
What to watch in the coming days
Watch for three indicators that will determine whether the campaign escalates into a prolonged conflict or moves toward negotiated containment: public US operational orders and legal framing for follow‑on strikes; the cohesion of Iran’s interim leadership and the speed with which Tehran can reconstitute command-and-control; and the positions taken by major external powers — notably Russia, China and key European states — on arms resupply, sanctions relief or mediation. Equally important will be the humanitarian picture: mounting civilian casualties and strikes on sensitive facilities (including nuclear‑adjacent sites) will increase international pressure for a ceasefire and will erode Western legitimacy if proportionality and discrimination are not demonstrably observed. (washingtonpost.com)