What is with Supply Chain Security in case of defense?

Since the Russian aggression against Ukraine, NATO is again in concrete planning and preparation in order to react against hybrid and kinetic measures committed by enemy state or non-state actors. Due to its location, Western Europe plays a pivotal role in a wide range of possible scenarios. Amongst all possible threats and counter measures, one matter is of high importance in all scenarios and stages of conflict. It’s supply chain security. 

May it be a direct confrontation with limited effects on the entire NATO territory and/or its population or may it be a concerted action against infrastructure and/or attacks on civilian targets in wider areas, too – the smoothest possible operation of logistics is a key element. This is also of importance for delivering materiel for the fighting forces but also for providing the population with all matters of food, medicines and other basic needs.

We have spoken with Luca Urciuoli. He is Associate Professor at the KTH Royal Institute of Technology in Sweden. This country is famous for its approach of “Total Defence” – an approach that includes all areas of public and civil life into defense. Luca Urciuoli is not only Associate Professor at KTH Royal Institute of Technology but also Adjunct Professor at the MIT-Zaragoza Logistics Center, and Research Affiliate at the MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics, specializing in supply chain managementlogistics, and risk and resilience management. 

He has conducted extensive research in supply chain management, with a particular focus on cybersecurity and risk management in supply chains. Dr. Urciuoli has contributed significantly to the field through his work on risk-based and resilience strategies for supply chain management, emphasizing the importance of information sharing, business intelligence, and public-private partnerships. He has published numerous articles in prestigious journals on topics such as supply chain security, cyber threats, and risk management and resilience. 

Dr. Urciuoli’s expertise in supply chain security is further evidenced by his involvement several research projects where he analyses risk management and resilience strategies in manufacturing and logistics companies . His research and insights have made him a sought-after speaker at conferences organized by international organizations, where he addresses critical issues in supply chain security and management.

Dr. Urciuoli – to what extent do we need the existing logistical capabilities when Europe would only concentrate on basic supply of the civil society in a war?

In war scenarios, logistics capabilities play a crucial role in supporting both civil society and military activities. Civil society needs logistics to ensure timely delivery of essential supplies, e.g. food medicines etc.; or to provide first responses, like medical aid and disaster relief or execute evacuations. The military needs a logistics system that can supply troops, fuel, equipment, and ammunitions or ensuring the maintenance and repair of the equipment. So, all in all I believe that EU infrastructure will need to be able to accommodate two logistics flows, hence coordinating and synchronizing its usage to comply with the requirements of civil society as well as military ones.

Is there an existing phased or regionalized plan somewhere in Europe to provide the population in urban areas/remote regions during conflicts?

I do not know if there is one specific looking at the logistics/transport infrastructure in a war context. However, in general the European Union has promoted activities to strengthen infrastructure in rural areas. One of them is published on European level. It points out 10 goals: https://rural-vision.europa.eu/rural-vision/shared-goals_en among them rural actions in EU are expected to address challenges related to food security, economic opportunities and ensure access to goods and services, e.g. transport.Nevertheless, it is known that infrastructure serving remote areas has limited capacity and is highly vulnerable. Capillarity, accessibility, capacity are known to be be low in rural areas. Even in peace-time. This implies that it would take little to disrupt its functions, e.g. a bridge collapse could permanently halt replenishments by railway or road. This could cause scaled effects of limited malicious actions.

How much of existing logistical capabilities would be available for the transport of troops and materiel, food, etc. for defense without endangering basic supply of the people in Europe?

In my view there is a strong need to renovate and upgrade infrastructure and logistics assets to ensure that storage and transport capacity for defense purposes are available. The main actors like NATO, EDA and other EU forces have in place solutions to handle the logistics from the perspective of manufacturing, maintain & repair, and deliver. Nevertheless, the available infrastructure has to be used for civilian and military purposes and thereby leads inevitably to interruptions/disruptions. When utilization increases, capacity is limited with consequences on scheduling flexibility. 

Following this reasoning, the most vulnerable transport mode is probably the railway, which is today used for passengers and goods. These two modes are actually split based on day-time and/or type of railway truck used (goods during nights – passengers during working times). So far, infrastructural capacity has been an suppressing issue in the past and it is actually right now. The railway system in Europe faces significant challenges due to the lack of standardized electrical systems across EU countries (e.g., different voltages and signalling systems). These inconsistencies create inefficiencies in the movement of goods and passengers, as trains may need to stop at borders for adjustments or even switch locomotives. Furthermore, I see many more constraints upcoming when military supplies have to start using this infrastructure in parallel to a large extent, too.Same for seaports or airports. 

The road infrastructure gives more flexibility, but there are limitations in terms of weight-load in trucks and regarding the types of vehicles that can use the infrastructure. Tanks need trucks to be transported. And the road-system is a very open one. There are for example initiatives to increase security in parking spots on main EU highways, especially in view of the needs for military logistics.

To what extent do warfare-scenarios play a role in common logistics & supply chain security management for the private sector today?

In general there are recommendations and instructions given to the private sector, where in case of emergencies civil supply chains/logistics actors will have to provide their assets to support military actions or any other emergency necessities. Civil protection agencies release recommendations to populations and industries. In Scandinavian countries these agencies are holding workshops to train and ensure preparedness across several industrial sectors. 

What I expect is that industries will have to provide large parts of their supplies to the military. Freight carrier  will have to make their vehicles available. In some cases, manufacturing companies will need to train their workforce to produce for defense and to use their production lines to manufacture or customize products for military requirements. Actors engaged with critical supply chains will then have to look for more local sources, for recycling or have to prepare for disruptions caused by armed attacks against their operations.

Are there any significant adaptations in the private sector that reflect and prepare for a possible conflict/war in Western Europe?

What I have seen at the moment is mostly training and preparedness, e.g. working with scenarios or table-top exercises. Apart from that, there is more emphasis on re-shoring operations and safeguarding critical supplies in specific sectors (e.g. energy, semi-conductor, mining etc.).

What would be the difference in scale and intensity that should be estimated in a warfighting-scenario in comparison to usual risks in peacetime?

The main difference is that usual risks in peacetime are geographically dispersed around the world, requiring mobility of the emergency resources. In such a situation there is need to ensure protection where the hazards are manifesting. For instance, in the past we had problems with piracy outside Somalia, or today we have the Houti rebels attacking cargoes. In these instances, we need military support to protect cargo, consisting of people and naval vessels escorting or patrolling sensitive areas. 

In case of a regional European conflict, we would still need mobile resources, but I believe that there could be more emphasis on the infrastructure and the need for infrastructure maintenance/repair. Our local industries and infrastructure will be the target of attacks (including terrorism and sabotage). Their damage and disruptions will bring society under tension, weaken governments, suppressing population and will bind military forces or hinder their deployment.

How should a protection of supply chains by military forces be organized regarding the global and long haul?

For this specific question we published a paper some years ago, looking at how the energy sector secures its supply chains: https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/SCM-09-2012-0307/full/html Gas and oil extraction may come from high-risk countries where terrorism or riots may break out and therefore plants or extraction sites need to be secured to protect employees and ensure continuous production. In long-haul transport private firms or militaries can provide armed guards on boards of sea vessels. In the paper we also mention the importance of foreign politics and interaction with industry lobbies to ensure military intervention in sensitive areas. For instance, in the past NATO established convoys to escort sea vessels and protect them from pirates attacks outside Somalia.

So, in general it is a matter of identifying and prioritizing critical supplies, protect manufacturing and transport (in coordination with private companies or NATO), evaluate whether these can be on-shored in terms of manufacturing/logistics capacity. All supplies that are localized are easier to protect. 

What international and state-based frameworks and regulations are existing in obligatory provision of private logistics for defense purposes?

There are existing national frameworks that impose the usage of logistics infrastructure and assets belonging to private actors, for military purposes. Depending on the situation, all EU-countries can seize and take control to handle military related tasks or manage an emergency/disaster.

As an example, Sweden signed an agreement in 2023 with the UK and US defense to  ensure continued defense cooperation. In Article 3 “ACCESS TO AND USE OF AGREED FACILITIES AND AREAS” it is stated: “When requested, the Swedish Executive Agent shall make reasonable efforts to facilitate temporary access to and use of private land and facilities (including roads, ports, and airfields), and public land and facilities (including roads, ports, and airfields) that are not a part of an Agreed Facility and Area, including those owned or controlled by Sweden or by local authorities, by U.S. forces, U.S. contractors, and Swedish contractors for use in support of U.S. forces. U.S. forces, U.S. contractors, or Swedish contractors shall not bear the cost of such facilitation.”

What is the demand of the private sector for protecting logistics infrastructure by military and/or police forces?

Normally the private sector can secure their assets by their own, using private guards/services. Governments and the private sector have established various frameworks and standards for supply chain security, such as CTPAT, AEO, and TAPA EMEA. In the exceptional case of larger conflicts an intervention from the military / police forces can be requested. The case from the energy sector above is an example of how military will then be involved. Recently there was a grain deal (Black Sea Grain Initiative) to facilitate the export of grain through the Black sea, which responds to the need for escorting vessels and prevent a global food crisis. Yet, this initiative faced significant challenges and was ultimately suspended in July 2023 since Russia withdrew from the agreement because of economic and security concerns. In particular, Russia was worried that the escorting operations could be exploited to conceal /smuggle military equipment or to attack Russian ships and infrastructure in the Black Sea area.

Are there any concrete counter-measures or plans against criminal or terrorist groups evolving their activities in a war-fighting scenario?

Sweden has published a new strategy plan against terrorism, where the threat of war is considered as a factor raising the complexity of potential threat scenarios. I know that there are initiatives for cybersecurity. A cyber attack may halt our manufacturing and logistics operations. Fake news can be spread to destabilize governments, polarize populations and provoke riots. Likewise, the EU is looking for alternatives to restore mining, to produce semi-conductors locally and how to exploit local energy sources.

In general, there is need to secure societies in times of war. Even in the uprising of wars these tense situations destabilize governments, increase the risk of plundering, lead to a lack of territorial control (which again increases criminal activities). These situations are a birthplace of self-organized groups (e.g. “resistance”) which may escalate in further crimes like theft, black market/trade, sabotage or lead to terror attacks. 

Perhaps another important sector we have to look at is the cultural heritage which is typically targeted in wars for diverse reasons. One of them is destroying cultural identities which facilitates cultural invasion and is intended to lead to a loss of cultural origin in societies. The second aspect on this is focused on money. These artifacts are then traded on the black market. During the second world war there were special forces protecting cultural heritage and recovering stolen artifacts plundered by Russian and German forces.

Dr. Urciuoli, many thanks for the interview. 

More on logistics from a security point of view can be found here.